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CASE COMMENTS

GUEST STATUTE: APPLICABILITY OF GUEST STATUTE
EXCEPTION TO COLLEGE STUDENTS
Nordone v. Richardson, 168 So. 2d 550 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964)
Weiss v. Ballagh, 169 So. 2d 530 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964)
In Nordone v. Richardson,' a nineteen-year-old college student
who suffered personal injuries in an automobile accident while being
driven home from class, brought an action in ordinary negligence
against his host driver. Florida's Guest Motorist Statute2 requires
that a guest prove "gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct" 3 to recover for personal injuries. Plaintiff relied on the exception to the Guest Statute, which makes the statute inapplicable "to
school children or other students being transported to or from schools
or places of learning in this state." 4 The trial court granted a final
summary judgment for the defendant and plaintiff appealed. In reversing and remanding, the district court HELD, the exception in
the Guest Statute is applicable to college students being transported
to or from regular school sessions. 5 Therefore, plaintiff could recover upon proof of ordinary negligence.
In Weiss v. Ballagh,6 a college student sued the driver of an automobile in which he had been a passenger for personal injuries suffered in an accident on a weekend trip from school to his brother's
home located in another city. Plaintiff alleged ordinary negligence
and defendant relied on the Guest Motorist Statute as a bar to plaintiff's recovery. The trial court submitted to the jury the question
whether the plaintiff was within the student exception in the Guest
Statute. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. In reversing,
the district court relied on Nordone v. Richardson7 and HELD, a
college student is within the exception as a matter of law, and directed
that a new trial be granted on the question of ordinary negligence of
the defendant.8
These two decisions represent the latest and most liberal approach
to the student exception to Florida's Guest Motorist Statute. The
Guest Statute was originally enacted into law in 1937, and included
the proviso excepting "children or other students being transported
1. 168 So. 2d 550 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1964).

2. FIA.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

STAT.

§320.59 (1963).

Ibid.
Ibid.
Nordone v. Richardson, 168 So. 2d 550 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
169 So. 2d 530 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
168 So. 2d 550 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
Weiss v. Ballagh, 169 So. 2d 530 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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to or from schools or places of learning ...." The various insurance
interests have been generally recognized as the major promoters of the
Guest Statute and their interest reflected a desire to prevent "hitchhikers" from recovering in an action against the bestower of a
gratuitous ride.10 Collusive interfamily suits are also discouraged.
The statement that "the law on the rights of an injured automobile
guest in Florida has been and still is in a most confused state"" is
unassailable. The underlying reason for this confusion perhaps results from a lack of knowledge of the purpose behind the Guest
Statute. The Florida Supreme Court, in Koger v. Hollahan,12 helped
to clarify this area by indicating that the purpose of the legislature
in passing the act was simply to prevent the recipient of a gratuitous
ride from recovering from his host by merely proving ordinary negligence. The court stated that the legislature was concerned with the
propriety and fairness of the recovery by a free rider, whether invitee or "hitchhiker," 3 and sought to limit the recoveries by imposing a greater requirement of proof.14 The confusion, however,
generated by the student exception has not yet been dispelled.
There appear to be various explanations why the exception was
included in the Guest Statute. The most logical of these is that the
legislature merely intended to give school children, who are too
young to object to the erratic behavior of their host, a cause of action
without requiring them to meet the high degree of proof required
by the Guest Statute. It is difficult to determine the purpose of the
legislature in enacting this measure. But it is reasonable to assume
that the legislature had a relatively limited class of plaintiffs in mind
when it included the student exception.
5
In Schwenck v. Jacobs,1
the first case interpreting the exception,
the court, merely repeating the words of the exception, held that it
applied to young "school children . . . being transported to or from
schools .
1...",6
In Summersett v. Linkroum,7 the court held the exception applicable to a six-year-old plaintiff. It expanded the earlier
approach by holding a plaintiff who was picked up at a place other
than directly in front of the schoolhouse was not deprived of her
privileged status under the exception.
In Summersett and Schwenck the exception was held applicable

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

§320.59 (1963).
Tipton, Florida'sAutomobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 287 (1958).
Id. at 298.
144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685 (1940).
Id. at 783, 198 So. at 687.
Ibid.
160 Fla. 352, 35 So. 2d 123 (1948).

16.

FLA. STAT. §320.59 (1963).

17.

44 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1950).

9.

FLA. STAT.
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to young school children. Two later cases' S expanded this view by
holding the exception to include high school students. In expanding
the scope of the exception in these two cases the court indicated,
however, that the new interpretation would not go without limitation.
The exception was held to be inapplicable if the student were going
to or from extracurricular activities rather than to or from regular
school sessions.'9 A definite departure from the route to or from
school, capable of being termed a new venture, would also render
°
the exception inapplicable.2
The gradual transition from a conservative to an increasingly
liberal interpretation of the exception as seen in these cases would
not be cause for alarm were it not for the Nordone and Weiss decisions. The results reached in the earlier cases appear to be attributable to a logical interpretation of the exception. These two
decisions are evidence of the present need for legislative reconsideration of the exception in light of the developing trend toward a liberal
construction.
The 1957 case of Farrey v. Bettendorf2 ' involved a high school
student injured in an accident while returning from a regularly
scheduled school basketball game. The Florida Supreme Court stated
in its decision that the application of the exception should be limited
to those instances where children and other students are transported
to their respective schools or places of learning every morning to be
later returned from such school sessions to their respective homes. 22
The court held that the exception should not be extended to include
extracurricular activities.
In Farrey the Florida Supreme Court indicated that the purpose
of a statutory exception is to limit or restrain the application of the
statute. The court further stated that such exceptions should be
strictly construed. Applying this rule of strict construction the court
concluded that the operation of the exception should not be enlarged
to include classes of people that the legislature did not intend to
include. But the court gave no guidance as to who the legislature
intended to include.
In Nordone, the defendant argued that the exception was applicable only to school children of tender years. 23 The court reaffirmed
the need for a strict construction as stated in Farrey, but then went
on to apply the exception to the facts of the case. The court said
18. Farrey v. Bettendorf, 96 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1957); Croxton v. Skoglund, 151
So. 2d 24 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
19. Farrey v. Bettendorf, 96 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1957).
20. Croxton v. Skoglund, 151 So. 2d 24 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
21. 96 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1957).
22. Id. at 893.
23. Nordone v. Richardson, 168 So. 2d 550, 551 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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"one who is taking a course of instruction in an institution of learning
is entitled to be classed as a student," 24 and is therefore entitled to
the advantages offered by the exception. The court stated that by
referring to schools or places of learning the legislature must have
intended the exception to include "institutions of learning, such as
"25
colleges, universities and the like ...
The difficulty with the Nordone decision is primarily the broad
language employed by the court. By failing to define "an institution
of learning" the court has laid the predicate for increasingly liberal
interpretations of the exception. There are numerous institutions
potentially within the language used by the court and those attending
them would clearly be students. 26 This decision may well be a correct
interpretation of the exception, but the broadness of the language is
inconsistent with the spirit of the supreme court's earlier interpretation of the exception.
In Weiss, the defendant relied entirely on the decision in Farrey
for support of his contention that the exception to the Guest Statute
did not apply.21 The court rejected the defendant's contention. There
is a distinct conflict between the Weiss and Farrey decisions. The
fact that the plaintiff in Weiss was going to visit his brother in another
town had absolutely no relation to his attendance at classes. On the
contrary, it appears that his trip was completely unrelated to any educational purpose. Weiss, therefore, indicates that it is of no concern
where the student is going so long as he has been at school.
In the earlier cases the courts seemed to take a conservative approach, but the Nordone and Weiss decisions commit two district
courts of appeal to a liberal interpretation of the exception. Together
the Nordone and Weiss decisions have not only enlarged the group
included within the exception, but have also increased the factual
contexts to which it may be applied.
It is difficult to determine the reason for the increasing liberality
with which the exception is now being interpreted. From the time of
the Guest Statute's enactment the cases have reflected varying degrees
of judicial hostility to it. This hostility apparently largely stems from
the feeling that merely because a ride was grautitously given is no
valid reason for insulating the host driver from liability for his ordinary negligence. This judicial attitude represents a basic disagreement with the policy underlying the statute. The courts could well

24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 552.
26. Vocational schools, business schools, barber and beautician colleges, and
adult education classes are a few examples.
27. In relying upon Farrey, defendant contended that the factual contexts
were similar and that the ultimate result should therefore be the same.
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